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Abstract:
The following research report seeks to investigate the recent occurrence of military coup 
d’états in the geographical sub-region of West Africa. Military coups staged in both 
Mauritania (August 2008) and Guinea (December 2008) represent an alarming spike in the 
incidence of illegal political takeovers and raise questions as to what form of response is 
required in order to limit, or completely eradicate, the scourge of unconstitutional changes of 
government (UCG) from the continent. This report suggests that the African Union (AU), in 
its commitment to the ideals of political legality and legitimate governance, is capable of 
addressing UCG in Africa through its inherent ability to induce long-term normative 
reformations regarding democracy and constitutionality.  
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4Chapter 1
Africa – A History of Military 
Coups
“The African military has not retired to the barracks, and it is only a matter of time before it 
returns, unless something drastic is done to prevent a return.”1
                                                          
1Onwumechili, C. ‘African Democratization and Military Coups’ Greenwood Publishing Group, 1998, pg 37  
5Map of Africa
Map of West Africa
6The pervasiveness with which military coups have plagued African politics in its postcolonial 
history has led many observers to conclude that the military coup d’état in Africa has become 
an ‘institutionalized mechanism for succession.’2 Indeed, since the majority of African states 
gained independence, the frequency and distribution of military coups has been both high and 
widespread. The end of colonial rule on the continent brought with it an immediate sense of 
optimism and a genuine belief in the ability of Africa’s new leaders to guide the continent 
into a novel era of pluralist democracy. However, the history books reveal that civilian rule in 
Africa has largely been sidelined by ongoing military usurpations and subsequent military 
rule. When one considers that between 1960 and 1982, almost 90 percent of the 45 
independent African states experienced a military coup, an attempted coup, or a plot3 – it 
throws into sharp relief the fact that the military coup has gone hand in hand with Africa’s 
political development, or lack thereof. 
Generally characterized by a sudden and often violent overthrow of an existing government4, 
coups entail a shift in political power that circumvents democratic and constitutional 
mechanisms of political succession. By 1990, more than 60 successful coups had taken place 
on the continent5, leaving in their wake vast amounts of analysis and proposed hypotheses 
aiming to uncover the causes behind military coups. 
Astonishingly, by the late 1990’s, Mauritius was the only African state where political power 
had changed hands as a result of a government’s defeat in a freely contested election6, a clear 
reflection of Africa’s historically restrained democratic development. The political and socio-
economic impact that the majority of military coups have induced, coupled with their 
overarching anti-developmental consequences, has precipitated both qualitative and 
quantitative analysis surrounding their frequency, trends and geographical distribution. 
Despite extensive analysis, Samuel Decalo accurately sums up the difficulty in attempting to 
put a finger on the causes of military coups: 
                                                          
2 Craig Jenkins, J. and Kposowa, A. ‘Explaining Military Coups D’état: Black Africa, 1957-1984’ American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 55. No. 6 (Dec. 1990)  pg 861
3 Loc. Cit 
4 McGowan, P. ‘African Military coups d’état, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution’ The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol. 41, No.3 (Sep. 2003) pg 341
5 Onwumechili, C. op cit. pg 37 
6 Luckham, R. ‘The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues’ 
African Studies Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Sep. 1994) pg 27
7‘Coup motivations are often murky and convoluted and manifest the intertwining of structural roots 
of instability with the most parochial considerations. They pose thorny problems of assessing human 
motives, separating between particularistic and systemic destabilizing conditions and between primary 
and secondary variables.’7
The man on horseback theory
Whilst the propensity for military coups in Africa can be attributed to a number of variables, 
the resultant impact that unconstitutional political takeovers have had on Africa’s positive 
political development and good governance is injurious. Military takeovers in Africa have 
often been justified by the perpetrators as a necessary political intervention, a means of 
stabilising and rectifying the wrongs of civilian governments. Despite the fact that many 
military coup perpetrators promote the idea that the regimented characteristics and strong 
leadership qualities displayed by the military are necessary traits of good political 
governance, it would seem that the vast majority of military governments in Africa are not 
suited to the task of political governance. ‘Those who greeted the advent of soldiers into 
politics as a new modernizing force, disciplined and capable of promoting progress, were to 
be terribly disappointed.’8 In the case of Africa, one could fairly suggest that the term ‘a 
military in government’ is a more accurate description than the term ‘military government’. 
Thus, despite the promise of sweeping changes and overall betterment, one of the most 
tangible changes in post-coup African states would seem to be a redistribution of political and 
economic power from civilian elites to military elites. It is no coincidence then, that the 
majority of successful military coups have been directly followed by immediate increases in 
military budgets and military personal fringe benefits.9 In already economically hard-pressed 
                                                          
7 Decalo, S. ‘Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Motivations and Constraints’ Second Edition, Yale University Press, 
1990, pg 15 
Whilst there remains no definitive classification of variables, secondary variables tend to be grouped according 
to broader contributing factors to coup propensity, these may include: Africa’s history of economic stagnation, 
a lack of post-colonisation political development, Africa’s tribal make-up and its incompatibility with 
governance within a Western-centric political system as well as the strong role that African militaries have 
played in the continents political history. Primary variables often look to specific aspects within an individual 
state, these may include: the nature of political rule as imposed by the incumbent government, social 
prejudices and the social make-up within a state and the characteristics of the military itself (military size and 
state resource allocation, how prominent  a role the military plays in upholding government power, whether 
there exists a centralisation of power in the hands of a few key military figures etc.)       
8 Cervenka, Z ‘The Effects of Militarization of Africa on Human Rights’ Africa Today, Vol. 34, No.1/2 (1987) pg 
71
9 Decalo, S. op cit.  pg 18
8African countries, these budgetary commitments to the military are usually enough to stifle 
any potential for future economic growth.
One of the most concerning dimensions of military coups, is the fact that they are generally 
perpetrated by a small group of military personnel, whether it be a collection of junior 
officers or a handful of disgruntled generals. In this way, a military coup differs from a 
revolution, in which a significantly larger proportion of society seeks to implement changes 
in government. For this reason, successful military coups and resultant military rule places a 
broad spectrum of state apparatus and decision-making powers in the hands of a few, a 
situation which has historically limited the political mobility of the majority. Despite coup 
perpetrators often attempting to justify their actions as necessary in order to bring some form 
of stability to the state, military coups are most often orchestrated in order to benefit the coup 
perpetrators themselves. Even the supposed ‘guardian coup’10 therefore satisfies the interests 
of a small military elite rather than the interests of the population at large. In essence, an 
ongoing process of replacing one class of elites with another lies at the heart of what has 
prevented the majority of Africans from experiencing genuine political freedom and having a 
substantive voice concerning their futures. Even when it is not in direct political control of a 
state, the military in many African countries has come to be regarded as simply another 
faction of the ruling elite, so much so that it has often seen as the ‘armed wing of the 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie’11. This places the majority of African populations in a dangerous 
and perpetual cycle of ineffective and rapacious government rule be it military or civilian. 
Beyond this, history suggests that military coups carry an inherent propensity for triggering 
internal power struggles, personal power gambits, fractured leadership and subsequent 
attempted or successful countercoups.12 Once the military violates the professional ethic of 
political detachment and non-intervention, a precedent is established that impacts on the way 
future generations of military officers perceive their role within the state, seeing intervention 
as a viable means of securing their own interests rather than forming part of state apparatus 
                                                          
10 This is a term that is often used in describing a military coup that is executed under the pretence that the 
incumbent government is no longer sufficiently protecting the interests of the state and its population. The 
incumbent regime must therefore be usurped by a competent successor (in this case the military) in order to 
prevent any further incompetent governance. 
11 Thomson, A. ‘An Introduction to African Politics’ Routledge, New York, 2000, pg 128 
12 Decalo, S. op cit. pg 24 Countries such as Benin (1963, 1965, 1965, 1967, 1969), Burkina Faso (1980, 1982, 
1983, 1987), Ghana (1972, 1978, 1979, 1981) and Uganda (1971, 1979, 1980, 1985) serve as examples of states 
where military coups have precipitated a number of successive countercoups.
9under civilian rule. The contagion theory surrounding military coups goes further by 
suggesting that a military coup in one country greatly increases the chances of a military coup 
occurring in another country, particularly neighbouring states. A successful military coup in 
one state can often motivate other potential coup perpetrators to take action in the hope of 
similarly capturing power.13 Military coups in Africa would seem to sow the seeds of further 
political instability, a challenge to Africa’s hopes of fostering greater levels of political 
institutionalisation and the use of constitutional channels in bringing about political change. 
Shooting down institutionalisation 
‘The army moves into the presidential palace with no blueprints for social policy, little 
expertise in developmental administration, and certainly no control over levels of foreign 
investment and technical assistance’.14 This does little in terms of creating viable political 
institutions through which genuine development can take place, the military inherently 
showing little interest in promoting political institutionalisation. Political institutionalisation 
can be defined as a process through which stable, complex political structures and procedures 
are developed and concurrently legitimised to create a degree of subsystem autonomy.15 If the 
military is not willing to embrace some form of institutionalisation and the civilian 
government has been deposed, their logically remains little hope for positive political 
advance. However and perhaps most alarmingly, transparency and accountability have not 
been synonymous with governance in Africa, regardless of whether a civilian or military 
government is in power.  
Empirical and statistical analysis largely suggests that there exists no significant difference 
between military and civilian governments, when assessed in terms of substantive 
achievements in office and effective governance. Both civilian and military government 
display pyramidal power structures that ultimately articulate and secures the interests of very 
few, leaving the wider citizenry left wanting. Compounding this hierarchical nature of 
governance is the fact that African people are largely alienated from state institutions and 
processes, providing them no means of effecting any substantial change in the elite-serving 
                                                          
13 Souare, I. ‘Explaining the December 2008 Military Coup D’état in Guinea’ at 
kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/101182/.../Chapter+4.pdf (accessed 15 July 2009)
14 Decalo, S. op cit. pg 27
15 Ibid. pg 30
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nature of African politics.16 Indeed, over a period of time, the differences between the long-
term impact of the civilian and military modalities of governance are negligible. 17
Yet despite the fact that no significant difference appears to exist between civilian and 
military governments, based on achievements in office, the means through which a military 
regime is brought into power should also attract concern. In this sense, it is not simply the 
end result which poses a challenge to Africa’s positive political development, but also the 
means through which this end is achieved. 
Breaking the highest law 
‘[T]he constitution defines modalities by which power can be acquired and exercised, and 
any deviation from these norms is unconstitutional.’18 Indeed, military coups constitute a 
violation of a state’s highest law – the constitution. Whilst Africa’s history of military coups 
would suggest that notions of constitutionalism have hardly prevented coup conspirators from 
attempting unconstitutional takeovers, a healthy respect for the law of the state is a
fundamental aspect of building strong democracies and promoting good governance. Indeed, 
constitutions serve as legally-binding means of securing both the ideals and implementation 
of democracy. The model of democracy that Africa strives to attain has largely been defined 
as liberal parliamentary democracy, a model that endorses freely contested elections, 
constitutionally guaranteed rules of law and multipartyism.19 In protecting these democratic 
principles, constitutions effectively limit the power of the state by encasing the actions of the 
government within a predetermined framework. This goes hand in hand with protecting the 
liberties of the population, ensuring that the government does not abuse the power that has 
been vested within it. 
‘Constitutions and constitutionality therefore embody the practices, customs, and rules 
through which power is established, exercised, and transmitted in the state, ensuring the 
primacy of the law over both the governed and the governors – in other words, no one is 
above the law.’20 Adherence to a states’ constitution by a ruling group precipitates 
                                                          
16 Ikome, F.N ‘Good Coups and Bad Coups: The Limits of the African Union’s Injunction on Unconstitutional 
Changes in Power in Africa’ Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand, 2007, pg 19
17 Ibid. pg 16
18 Ibid. pg 11
19 Luckham, R. op cit. pg 63
20 Ikome, F.N  op cit. pg 10
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legitimacy. Whilst the idea of legitimacy is often a difficult concept to fully comprehend, 
what is clear is that ruling groups that act outside of the predefined laws of the state cannot be 
seen to be acting in the best interests of the wider population. In line with this logic, if a 
military coup is seen as an unconstitutional action, any form of government that comes about 
as a result of the coup would logically lack legitimacy.  Africa’s need for legitimate and 
strong governance requires an overall endorsement and respect for constitutionalism, failing 
to do so, creates an atmosphere in which political disorder thrives and no mechanism for 
accountability exists. In this sense, every military coup that takes place in Africa can be seen 
as yet another assault on Africa’s potential for creating a continental political atmosphere in 
which pluralist democracy is the norm and unconstitutional takeovers are deemed intolerable.
The constitutionality of constitutions 
However, constitutionalism presents its own challenges not only with regard to promoting its 
existence and enforcing its implementation, but due to the fact that constitutions themselves 
are often subject to the influence of undemocratic and biased political forces. As a political 
and legal entity, constitutions are not fashioned by a higher power, but rather are articulated 
and enforced by those already maintaining political influence. If the process through which 
constitutions are engineered does not reflect the best interests and desires of the broader 
citizenry, then it serves to reason that the constitution itself serves little purpose it protecting 
the rights of those excluded from the creation process. The alienation of the citizenry from 
state processes effectively limits the voice of the majority from influencing the engineering, 
reconstruction or amending of their own constitutions. By limiting the amount of 
stakeholders involved in the process of constitution construction leaves the door wide open 
for those already in power to serve their own interests via the creation of a ‘legitimate’ 
constitution. As a result of this, ‘the current constitutions of many African countries were 
either arrived at as direct impositions, or came about as a result of elite-driven processes and 
agendas that tended to treat the interests and concerns of the greater majority of the people 
with disrespect and even contempt.’21
Without suggesting that all African constitutions should be deemed irrelevant, the alienating 
and illegitimate processes through which many African constitutions have come about brings 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
21 Ikome, F. N op cit. pg 20
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into question the validity of constitutionalism as a platform upon which good democratic 
governance can be built. It goes without saying that if a constitution is precipitated out of 
undemocratic and non-pluralistic processes; there can be little hope for the constitution itself 
serving as a vanguard to the ideals of democracy. If African constitutions run the very real 
risk of being manipulated by ruling elites and perpetuating already existing inequalities and 
undemocratic institutions, why then, should we be concerned about the impact that 
constitutional takeovers can have on the principles of constitutionalism?
An aspect to this question revolves around ensuring that the process through which 
constitutions are constructed or amended must begin to be an inclusive process. Whilst this
maintains its own difficulties and challenges, the key concern should be Africa’s ability to 
uphold the central tenants of constitutionalism as a guiding mechanism that encompasses 
notions of democratic governance and political legitimacy. It is not that constitutions by 
themselves automatically dictate successful and peaceful regime change, but rather that by 
their inherent composition they contribute to making such changes a real possibility and then 
a probable reality.22 The protection and strengthening of constitutionalism needs to be upheld 
whether the challenge stems from an outright illegal political usurpation or from the 
overriding of constitutionality at the hands of an incumbent government. Both types of 
constitutional challenges are damaging to the broader advancement of Africa’s political 
future, with the former presenting a challenge to the way in which constitutionally-prescribed 
political successions take place and the latter undermining the responsibility of government to 
uphold constitutionality as a guiding principle of governance. Africa, through continental 
organisations such as the African Union, needs to establish a platform upon which to tackle 
its countless political shortcomings and build its political future. It is only with an 
endorsement of constitutionalism as a principle that these goals can be achieved.
The plight of West Africa 
Whilst military coups and the unashamed disregard for constitutional ideals have impacted on 
nearly every independent African state, West Africa is recognised as the most coup-prone 
region on the continent. It is alarming to note that for a geographical sub region that 
comprises only one third of the continent’s states, more than half of all successful coups since 
                                                          
22 Tesfagiorgis, P and Wahui, W. ‘Constitution Building vs. Coup-making’ Open Democracy, April 2009 at 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/idea/africa-constitution-building-vs-coup-making (accessed 7 October 
2009) 
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independence have taken place in West Africa.23 Whilst the difficulty in placing one’s finger 
on the causes of military coups has already been noted, West Africa’s history of droughts, 
rapidly increasing populations and economic fragility has been compounded by entrenched 
militarism.24 These structural factors have all played their part in making West Africa a 
hotbed for military takeovers and largely incompetent political rule.  The military’s 
recognised disregard for institution building has been widely documented in the region, the
figure of the military lingering threateningly in the background of West Africa’s political 
fragility.
Since the first successful military coup d’état in Togo in 1963, West Africa has accounted for 
the majority of successful coups in sub-Saharan African since 1956.25 West African states 
such as Nigeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, and Sierra Leone have seemed to exist in an endless 
cycle of military takeover and military rule since independence. The fact that the military has 
twice usurped democratically elected governments in Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone is a 
greater reflection of West Africa’s military establishment’s infamous contempt for 
democratic rule.26 Illegal usurpations have become entrenched in the political character of 
West Africa, more so than in any other sub-region of the continent. ‘Military coups in West 
Africa have reinforced the primacy of violent domination over popular legitimation.’27
Table 1.1 
West African Military Coups since Independence (end 1999)28
State Independence 1950s/1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s Total
Benin 1960 1963, 1965, 
1965, 1967, 
1969
1972 6
Burkina 1960 1966 1974 1980, 1982, 6
                                                          
23 Adebajo, A and Rashid, I. (eds.) ‘West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region’, 
Lynnne Reinner Publishers, Inc. Colorado, 2004 pg pg 1
24 McGowan, P. and Johnson, T. ‘Sixty Coups in Thirty Years – Further Evidence Regarding Military Coups 
d’état’ in The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (sep. 1986) pg 541
25 Adebajo, A and Rashid, I. (eds.)  op cit. pg 147
26 Ibid. pg 148
27 Ibid. pg 149
28 Thomson, A. op cit. pg 124 
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Faso 1983, 1987
Cape Verde 1975 0
Cote 
D’Ivoire
1960 1999 1
Gambia 1965 1994 1
Ghana 1957 1966 1972, 
1978, 1979
1981 5
Guinea 1958 1984 1
Guinea-
Bissau
1974 1980 1999 2
Liberia 1947 1980 1
Mali 1960 1968 1991 2
Mauritania 1960 1978 1980, 1984 3
Niger 1960 1974 1996 2
Nigeria 1960 1966, 1966 1974 1983, 1985 1993 6
Senegal 1960 0
Sierra Leone 1961 1967, 1968 1993, 
1996, 
1997
5
Togo 1960 1963,1967, 
1967
3
Total 15 7 12 9 44
As one would expect, West Africa’s history of repressive regimes, autocrats, military regimes 
and incessant military coups has left the region in a political malaise. In order to promote 
ideals of constitutionality and political legitimacy, West Africa will have to break free from 
its perpetual cycle of political fragility. Having said this, the notion that political order as well 
as both good and democratic governance requires legitimation of political institutions holds 
15
true in West Africa, as it does across the continent. If military regimes are unresponsive to the 
needs of the majority and fail to promote some form of positive institutionalisation, then their 
presence on Africa’s political landscape should no longer be deemed acceptable. 
Fighting on two fronts 
However, as has been previously noted, both civilian and military governments have tainted 
Africa’s history of positive political development. Even those civilian governments that have 
been democratically elected have failed to break the continent’s long-standing tradition of
predatory-style governments that display both an indifference to the needs of their people and 
an active draining of already limited state resources. It is for this reason that the focus of this 
investigation has been levelled at the process through which governments have come into 
power, military coups representing the most deliberate and blatant attack on the ideals of 
constitutionalism and political legitimacy. Africa faces a twofold challenge from the 
perspective that it must continue to ensure that incumbent governments do not violate the 
constitutional principles which they have been elected to protect, as well as ensure that 
democratic political transitions become the continental norm. 
Africa and West Africa in particular, cannot begin to hope for better governance and effective 
rule unless measures are taken to equally prevent undemocratic rule and unconstitutional 
usurpations of power. It is only once an inalienable respect for constitutional law, democratic 
governance and legitimate transfers of political power has been entrenched, can Africa begin 
to viably promote better governance and development. Africa’s track record of autocratic and 
unconstitutionally elected governments paints the picture of a continent that has previously 
been engrossed by a total disregard for the principles and processes of constitutionality and 
democracy. Breaking this cycle of misrule and illegal power grabs requires a sincere 
commitment on the part of the continents’ regional and continental organisations to create 
positive precedents that will begin to reinforce the ideals of constitutionality and democracy. 
Africa requires a norm-creating avenue through it can begin to instil an acceptance of the 
notion that only democratically guided and democratically elected governments will be 
tolerated. Any deviation from this norm should be deemed a gross violation of the continent’s 
aspirations to create a political future that facilitates economic growth, social development 
and positive institutionalisation. If military coups and other unconstitutional actions continue 
to periodically undercut the foundations upon which to build Africa’s constructive political 
16
future, then breaking free of the continents shackled past will be an insurmountable task. 
However, contemporary trends in African politics would seem to point to an encouraging 
shift in levels of democracy and the protection of constitutional ideals. 
The big picture 
Principles of accountability and constitutional means of governance have gradually gained 
momentum in recent decades, with an encouraging number of West African states embracing 
democratic ideals and laying a solid foundation upon which to build further democratic 
institutions. This is despite a brutal return to military rule in Nigeria in 1993 and the 
overthrowing of democratically-elected leaders in Gambia and Niger in 1994 and 1996 
respectively.29 Niger was to suffer another coup in 1999, subsequent to a similar military 
takeover in Sierra Leone in 1997. These examples of illegal transitions of power, point to the 
still delicate political landscape that exists in West Africa, with the majority of states still 
finding it challenging to cement some form of political stability and implement genuine 
pluralistic democracy. However, one could fairly suggest that the last 15 years of West 
African politics have displayed encouraging signs of constructive and institutional-based 
political development, lending to the creation of a political atmosphere in which the military
coup is no longer found to be commonplace. 
Principles of good governance and plural democracy have gradually permeated through both 
regional, continental, and global actors, placing a more acute spotlight on those countries 
were transgressions of these principles are taking place.  Despite its historical impediments to 
positive political growth, West Africa has made strides in promoting both regional security 
and democratisation, the advent of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) being welcomed as a positive step in building regional ties and a collective 
interest in peace. 
The beginnings of West Africa’s democratic revival can largely be attributed to Benin, one of 
West Africa’s most prolific coup victims. In 1990, the country’s longstanding military rule 
was brought to an end and adopted a legitimately-constructed constitution, very similar to the 
                                                          
29 Le Vine, V. ‘The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism in West Africa’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 
35, no. 2 (Jun. 1997) pg 197
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one articulated by Benin’s post-independence leaders 30 years previously.30In their recent 
political history, West African states such as, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Senegal and have all 
welcomed more open political systems, whilst the likes of Niger, Benin, and Sierra Leone 
have seen the backs of autocratic military regimes during the 1990’s.31 These political trends 
point to a growing acceptance of democracy and constitutionality in West Africa and a 
concurrent rejection of autocratic and illegitimate governments. There are indications that the 
sub-region of West Africa is gradually beginning to turn its back on its infamous political 
history that rendered it the most coup-prone and unstable region in Africa. ‘[F]rom the 
perspective of power alternation and peaceful turnover of leaders, West Africa seems to be on 
the right path.’32      
Thus, the recent political events in Mauritania and Guinea should be seen as an alarming 
diversion on Africa’s road to immutable constitutional rule and political legitimacy. In the 
midst of West Africa’s ongoing process to create and sustain positive political 
institutionalisation, these events come as a worrying challenge to the regions movement 
towards better governance and political stability. Beyond this, it highlights the need for a 
Pan-African response to this evidently ongoing destabilization of governance in Africa. 
Military-led coups in Mauritania (August 2008) and Guinea (December 2009) have raised
fears of a resurgence of military coups in the region and have both been met with strong 
opposition by the AU. 
The cases of Mauritania and Guinea 
In the case of Mauritania, coming on the back of a successful military coup in 2005, the Head 
of the Presidential Guard, General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, seized power from the 
country’s first democratically elected leader, Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi.33 As one 
of the world’s poorest countries, Mauritania’s population of 13 million people have had to 
make due with a historically stagnant economy and relatively limited natural resources.34
                                                          
30 Ibid. pg 187
31 Adebajo, A and Rashid, I. (eds.) op cit. pg 2
32 ISS Situation Report: ‘2008-2009 Retrospective Look at the Last Year and Forecast for the New Year’, African 
Security, Analysis Programme, (author unknown) 11 February 2009
33 United Nations Security Council Report: Update Report. ‘The Resurgence of Coups D’états in Africa’. 15 April 
2009. No. 3 pg 1  
34 Zisenwine, D. ‘Mauritania’s Military Coup: Domestic Implications and Regional Challenges’ in Maddy-
Weitzman. B (ed.) Telaviv Notes: An Update on Middle Eastern Developments by the Moshe Dayan Centre,
August 19, 2008  at http://www.dayan.org/DZ%20-Mauritania.pdf (accessed 10 September 2009)
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Complicating these economic ills, Mauritania’s socio-political landscape has been 
characterised by an Arab elite dominating a largely Black African underclass.35  Situated in 
between Arab North Africa and Black Sub-Saharan Africa, Mauritania has failed to establish 
a stable unifying identity, making political rule a challenging undertaking.
The 2007 elections that brought Abdallahi to power were deemed to be free and fair, and 
heralded what seemed to be a new era in Mauritania’s political development. Not only was 
Abdallahi the first democratically-elected leader of the state but he was also the first not to 
rely on the military as an insurer of his political power. Yet it appears as if this 
disengagement from the military served only to strain civil-military relations and can be seen 
as the catalyst behind the coup on August 6th 2008. Reports suggest that support for
Abdallahi had started to falter within parliament, as those Members of Parliament loyal to 
figures within the Mauritanian military establishment did not approve of new proposed 
military appointments by the President.36 These new appointments would mean the axing of 
four top military commanders, including the Head of the Presidential Guard, General 
Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz.  Two weeks prior to the staging of the coup, the Mauritanian 
Parliament passed a motion of no confidence in the elected cabinet37, leading some observers
to suggest that a ‘political coup’ was staged prior to the military taking action.
With the military seizing control, coup leaders declared that a new ‘Mauritanian State 
Council’38 would be established in order to formalize their powers and, expecting 
international criticism, announced that elections would be held in order to vote in a new, 
democratically elected leader. Not only is the State Council made up entirely of senior 
military officials, 7 of the 11 members played an active role in the Mauritanian military 
takeover in 2005.39 The political events in Mauritania serve as a stark reminder of the delicate 
political situations that still persist throughout most of West Africa and how easily instances 
of unconstitutional political takeovers can swiftly undermine the positive political 
progression of an individual state as well as the sub-region as a whole. Whilst democratic 
                                                          
35 Loc. Cit
36 “Military Coup in Mauritania’, (author unknown)at http://www.afrol.com/articles/30157 (accessed 1 
September 2009)
37 ‘Troops Stage Coup in Mauritania’ (author unknown) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7544834.stm (accessed 
2 September 2009)
38 Zisenwine, D. op cit. 
39 Boucek, C. ‘Mauritania’s Coup: Domestic Complexities and International Dilemma’s’ in Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Middle East Program, Web Commentary, August 2008 pg 1 at  
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/boucek_mauritania.pdf (accessed 4 July 2009)
19
institutions and constitutionally-informed means of governance are starting to find firmer 
ground in which to fix themselves, the underlying structural causes of military coups still 
endure and much still needs to be done to fully protect the viability of constitutional, popular 
rule. 
Within months of the Mauritanian coup, the West African state of Guinea saw its military 
take over the reins of power in a bloodless coup, subsequent to the death of long-standing 
President, Lansana Conte. The coup leader, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, immediately 
suspended the Guinean constitution and forced the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the 
National Assembly to stand down.40 According to constitutional procedure, in the event of 
the President dying, the Speaker of the National Assembly would stand in as interim 
President for 60 days until an election would be held.41 It goes without saying that this 
unconstitutional intervention by a junior ranking army official serves as a stark example of 
how inadequate levels of institutionalisation remain in West Africa. Guinea has been ranked 
160 out of 177 on the United Nations development scale, and although possessing fairly 
extensive natural resources, particularly bauxite, the extent of corruption and financial 
mismanagement in the country has meant that the general standard of living has remained 
unacceptably low.42
The aftermath of both coups saw formal presidential elections being promised in Mauritania 
and Guinea. In Mauritanian, elections eventually took place in July of 2009 with General 
Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz being declared the winner with 52 percent of the national vote. In 
Guinea, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara snatched power with the promise that national elections 
would be held in January of 2010 and that he himself would not run for election. This was in 
line with public statements that the December 2008 military coup was a necessary 
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Much of Guinea’s economic and social woes can be attributed to the inept governance on the part of Guinea’s 
long-standing ruler, Lansana Conte. As much as the political events that unfolded subsequent to his death 
need to be addressed within the framework of preventing illegal political transitions, it must be noted that the 
way in which Conte ruled can by no means be deemed democratic. The complete abandonment of core 
constitutional practices by the Conte government was met with little or no denunciation by African leaders or 
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the installation of immovable constitutional principles cannot legitimately take place whilst certain incumbent 
governments fragrantly violate these very same principles whilst in office. 
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intervention in order to save the country from ongoing mismanagement and corruption and 
that the unconstitutional takeover served as a stabilising mechanism for the state and its well-
being. However, latest reports suggest that Camara has expressed his intention to stand as a 
candidate in the forthcoming election, leading many to believe that his junta’s already 
established power will be used to sway the results.43
Despite the fact that illegal transitions’ of power in both Mauritania and Guinea have been 
followed up by the promise or eventuation of legal electoral processes, Africa cannot accept 
the end result of what remains an undemocratic and unconstitutional usurpation of power. 
Changing times 
A cause for optimism or cynicism (depending on one’s interpretation) may be that these 
recent military coups have displayed some form of respect for the rule of law and
democracy by allowing for post-coup elections to take place. History would suggest that 
African military coups are traditionally followed by a ruthless consolidation of power by the 
new ruling junta and a fresh snubbing of democratic and constitutional processes. It has been 
these traditional post-coup conditions that have severely set back the potential for positive 
institutionalisation, the growth of democracy, the development and respect of democratic 
norms, as well as the bastardisation of military coups or any other form of unconstitutional 
act as a means of political succession. In light of this, perhaps one could argue that the days 
of flagrant political takeovers are coming to an end in West Africa and that international, 
continental and regional emphasis on democracy and political legitimacy is beginning to 
inform norms throughout the sub-region, norms that even ambitious coup leaders can no 
longer ignore. As has been previously mentioned, Africa requires an avenue through which 
this development of positive political norms can be consolidated and furthered in order to 
bring about a truly resolute ‘veil’ of prescriptive political ideals. The African Union now 
stands at the forefront of advancing Africa’s political ambitions and is now seen as a viable 
channel through which constructive political norms may be protected and developed. 
     
The recent political events that took place in West Africa cannot be overlooked or quietly 
accepted due to the vague hope of precipitating some form of tolerable ‘democratic’ outcome, 
and this report will look at the post-coup reaction of the African Union to the military coups 
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in both Mauritania and Guinea. It will be made clear that the AU cannot afford to overlook 
the damaging effects that illegal transitions of power are capable of causing within the 
broader context of Africa’s political development. Not only should incumbent governments 
be held accountable for any constitutional and/or democratic transgressions whilst in office 
but greater efforts must also be made to root out the incidence of unconstitutional political 
takeovers. By assessing the reaction (and its effectiveness) within the framework of the AU’s 
(as well as its predecessor, the Organization for African Unity) past and present policies 
towards unconstitutional transitions of power, policy suggestions will be made in order to 
formulate more realistic and viable courses of action in dealing with military coups on the 
continent.   
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Chapter 2
The African Union and the 
Fight for Democracy
“It is far better to be free to govern or misgovern yourself than to be governed by anybody
else”44
                                                          
44 Quote by Kwame Nkrumah, the First President of Independent Ghana 
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The recent upsurge in the incidence of military coups within the West African sub-region 
raises familiar questions regarding illegal political takeovers on the continent. If we accept 
that unconstitutional usurpation of power significantly undermines the potential for the 
principles of good governance, democracy, and constitutionality to become entrenched, then 
it follows that military coups cannot be seen as an isolated matter of domestic politics. 
Instead, an appreciation of the broader implications of military coups from a continental 
political development perspective is required. Africa’s drive towards greater cohesion and 
cooperation amongst individual states has meant that setbacks in domestic democratic 
processes reverberate throughout the continent. In an era where the African Union has gained 
legitimacy as a continental organisation, it has become clear that preventing and resolving the 
damaging effects of military coups cannot be addressed on a domestic state level. 
This chapter will illustrate the need for the African Union to reinforce both preventive and 
punitive measures in dealing with military coups and what policy mechanisms and practical 
measures the African Union currently has at its disposal. An understanding of the historical 
processes responsible for the formation of the Africa Union highlights the progress the 
organisation has made in placing greater emphasis on positive political development and 
rooting out unconstitutional transitions of political rule. Whilst the shortcomings of the AU’s 
predecessor – the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) – are well documented, they are 
worth revisiting in order to appreciate the need for an efficient and effective Pan-African 
organization to take root. The issue of ‘norm creation’ and its importance in the context of 
Africa’s future political development will also be illustrated throughout. 
An Africa United
The notion of Pan-Africanism is by no means a novel concept in the context of Africa’s 
history. As early as 1893, the promotion of greater African solidarity was taking shape 
through the initiation of the Congress on Africa as well as the creation of the African 
Association in 1897.45 In recognising the often marginalised existence of many Africans, 
these early conferences looked to respond to the historical alienation of Africans and foster 
the idea that Africans should begin to draw on their own strengths and capacities in order to 
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become self-reliant.46 In recognising the challenges facing Africans and the achievement of a 
better future, it became clear that greater solidarity was paramount in advancing their own 
interests. As colonialism drew to a close on the continent of Africa, the ideals of Pan-
Africanism gained even greater momentum and it was evident that newly elected 
governments would be designated the task of furthering the interests of their people and 
upholding the principles of collective African advancement. 
Formed in 1963, the Organisation of African Unity can be seen as the “second generation” of 
efforts to institutionalize Africa’s desire for greater integration amongst individual states. 
Despite lofty rhetoric concerning the need for a ‘united Africa’47, the desire to liberate white-
ruled parts of the continent was one of the main unifying interests of the original 31 member
states.48 With a sense of optimism surrounding the liberation of many African states during 
the 1960’s, much was expected of the OAU in facilitating Africa’s future social, economic 
and political prosperity. Yet despite attempting to project itself as a viable continental 
organisation, the OAU soon came to be seen as a farce. A policy of non-intervention in the 
affairs of Member States was the defining characteristic of the OAU, rendering the 
organisation impotent in its ability to reconstitute national policies in line with the ideals of 
Pan-Africanism. Far from cultivating greater unification amongst individual states –as 
espoused by the ideals of Pan-Africanism – the OAU came to be a loose association of 
sovereign governments.49
The reluctance on the part of individual states to relinquish power to a higher authority meant 
that Pan-Africanism was only being paid a superficial tribute in the sense that Heads of State 
were willing to come together under the banner of collective African prosperity, yet were 
blatantly unwilling to concede any form of individual authority in the name of creating an 
improved African future. Seen as a ‘toothless talking shop’50, the OAU nurtured the idea that 
African Heads of State would remain immune from any form of castigation and that the 
principles of accountability and transparency in national governance would largely go 
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unchecked. With issues of intra-state conflict and political malaise being declared out of 
bounds for the OAU; the ‘trade union of tyrants’ preferred to focus on the maintenance of 
their existing power and the security of state elite interests.51 The inability of the OAU to 
monitor and police the affairs of its own Member States became the most glaring deficiency 
in the organisations claim for legitimacy. Political authoritarianism, corruption, economic 
mismanagement, bad governance, and the abuse of human rights all went largely unchecked 
during the time of the OAU.52
A continent led astray 
A consequence of the OAU’s policy of non-intervention was that the way in which political 
power was exercised, and transferred within its member states became immaterial.53 Thus, 
whilst paying lip-service to the core principles of African advancement, the OAU created a 
precedent of non-interference and effectively undercut the possibility of promoting genuine 
political development amongst its members. The failure of the OAU to implement timely and 
adequate forms of preventative and punitive measures in dealing with non-compliant 
members meant that its contribution to African political development was to institutionalise 
the notion of ‘action without consequence’ when it came to issues of constitutionality, 
democracy and the rule of law. If we accept institutions as ‘stable sets of norms, rules, and 
principles’ that ‘constrain activity, shape expectations, and prescribe roles’54 then the OAU 
was successful in creating certain institutions. However, the aforementioned shortfalls in 
OAU policy enforcement meant that established expectations and norms surrounding good 
governance and the respect for constitutionality fell very short of what can be deemed 
positive institutionalisation. In tolerating political malpractice, the OAU has had a significant 
hand in shaping norms of political accountability and the historical contempt many African 
leaders have maintained regarding good governance and constitutionality. 
Hence, the plethora of military coups and other illegal transitions of power that took place 
during the existence of the OAU were not met with any form of sufficient response and were 
left unrestrained in what became an illegitimate political ‘free for all’. Beyond calling for the 
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‘unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive 
activities on the part of a neighbouring State or any other States’55 the OAU failed to 
explicitly sight unconstitutional political takeovers (and the desired response to such 
transitions of power) within its charter. It was only towards the end of the Organisation of 
African Unity’s existence did the organisation formally address the issue of unlawful political 
takeover and whilst this did contribute to later policy formation around the issue, it can only 
be considered too little too late within the context of the OAU’s history. 
Table 2.1 
Incidence of military coups in Africa by region during the tenure of the OAU (taken from 
beginning 1964 – end 1999)56
Region Number of military coups
Southern Africa 3
East Africa 9
West Africa 36
North Africa 9
Central Africa 10
Islands Off Mainland Africa 6
Total 73
An analysis of military coups in Africa and the subsequent response of the African Union 
must take into account the role of the OAU and its failure to adequately address political 
actions which have historically set the tone of Africa’s negative political development. The 
OAU bequeathed the African Union many burdensome legacies and one of the primary tasks 
of the AU is to now break free from the institutionalised ‘shackles’ of its predecessor. 
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Dying with the times 
The blind commitment that the OAU made to the principle of sovereignty served to restrict 
the ability of the organisation to hold its member states accountable for the failure to uphold 
their commitment to the OAU and its self-determined principles. In many respects, the 
Organisation of African Unity was a product of its times. The interests and identity of 
individual African states came to define the principles, concerns and interpretations of its 
mission.57 Norms of global governance were also to influence the state-centric and sovereign 
tone of the organisation. Indeed, in the first two decades of the organisation’s existence, 
global issues of good governance, human rights, and constitutionality were usually of little 
concern amidst the tensions and security concerns of the Cold War and a general 
preoccupation with inalienable sovereignty and non-interference. Yet the global political 
landscape has changed dramatically when compared with the first few decades of the OAU’s 
existence. Since the inception of the OAU until its eventual termination, global politics have 
embraced a greater awareness and respect for increased political accountability and a 
healthier adherence to the rule of law. In particular, there have been comprehensive shifts in 
conceptions regarding sovereignty.58
The principle backbone of the modern Westphalian political system, absolute sovereignty has 
come to be seen as a notion that is incompatible with contemporary political trends.
Whilst the Charter of the United Nations enshrines the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention59, this internationally recognised doctrine has often been seen as a strategic tool 
for tyrannical and inept political regimes to call upon in order to avoid any form of 
international rebuke. Unsurprisingly, the immovable adherence to sovereignty on the part of 
the OAU goes hand in hand with both its unwillingness and policy-induced inability to 
challenge noncompliant member states. Modern conceptions of sovereignty no longer 
endorse the concept of ‘absolute’ sovereignty. Rather, sovereignty has come to be seen as a 
responsibility on the part of individual governments to endorse democratisation and good 
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governance as well as protect the interests of their civilian population. In this way, 
sovereignty is no longer seen as an automatic right bestowed upon any individual or political 
party that holds power but rather an undertaking on the part of those in power to live up to 
their duties as shaped by the international community. 
As such, the ‘right’ to sovereignty can only be bestowed and maintained by those who 
comply with contemporary ideals of good governance and responsible rule. The once 
immutable concepts of sovereignty and non-intervention are now subject to predetermined 
factors of political legitimacy. Global actors and institutions are now increasingly wiling to 
bypass a state’s right to the control of its domestic affairs in instances where intervention is 
deemed necessary. Whilst the UN charter still upholds the principle of sovereignty as it was 
originally conceived, ‘new’ ideas surrounding sovereignty have become sufficiently accepted 
in practice to be regarded as a de facto international norm with many modern-day institutions 
shaping their political policy frameworks around such ideas.60
In the same way as the inception of the OAU was a product of its time so too did the times 
dictate the need for an overhaul of the organisation. The beginning of the 1990’s saw the 
Cold War draw to a close and with it, an end to many African states’ embroilment within
Cold War politics. The Cold War years saw a number of African states preoccupied with 
garnering support from either global superpower, usually at the expense of regional stability 
and good governance.61 Global trends in democratisation, the growing popularity of liberal 
political principles, the demand for respect of human rights and for political transparency by 
civil society organisations, and the re-conceptualisation of sovereignty ultimately rendered 
the OAU an archaic entity that could no longer claim any form of legitimacy in the face of it 
ongoing inability to effectively reign in its unruly members.
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A new dawn 
At the end of the 20th century, it became clear that Africa required a continental organisation 
that was willing and able to take on the new challenges of collective governance. The African 
Union was to rise out of the ashes of the OAU and was immediately faced with the task of
undoing the ingrained perception that member states could act without impunity. Absolute 
sovereignty could no longer stand in the way of taking decisive action against those states 
that failed to live up to their commitments to better governance and due regard for the 
principles of democracy and constitutionality. However, since taking over the reigns of 
continental authority, it is evident that the AU faces a broader task than that of simply 
bringing individual states into line – the leaders of the AU need to reconstruct a new set of 
norms for the African political arena. Unlike the OAU, the African Union must begin to place 
a renewed emphasis on not only how its member states conduct their domestic political 
affairs, but the manner in which transitions of political power take place. 
During the time of the OAU, unconstitutional political usurpations became an accepted 
means of political transition – a norm. The definition of unconstitutional changes of 
government (UCG) has widely been accepted as any one of the following acts:
 A military coup d’état against a democratically elected government
 Intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government 
 Replacement of democratically elected governments by armed dissident groups and 
rebel movements; and
 The refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning 
political party after free, fair and regular elections.62
The link between illegal political takeovers (military coups remaining the most common and 
deliberate) and the undercutting of broader politic development has already been made, and 
in line with this, the African Union and its ambitious goals for promoting African 
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advancement cannot be achieved without effectively preventing and responding to the 
encumbrance of military coup d’états.  
The African Union should be seen as an evolutionary entity and part of Africa’s developing 
ideal of true Pan-Africanism. The proposal to establish the African Union was put forward by 
the OAU Assembly Heads of State and Government in 1999 in Sirte, Libya.63 With the 
signing of the African Union Constitutive Act in July of 2000 and the subsequent 
inauguration of the organisation in July 2002, the AU officially took over all the assets and 
liabilities of its predecessor. The objectives and principles enshrined in the AU Constitutive 
Act, whilst maintaining many of the guidelines adopted by the OAU, represents a marked 
progression in terms of the authority the organisation has afforded itself. The investiture of 
the AU Constitutive Act could only come about once all member states had endorsed the 
guiding principles and objectives which the Act looks to preserve and in this way, member 
states have committed to upholding the overall goals that the AU has set for itself. However, 
many core principles of sovereignty have been assimilated into the African Union’s 
overarching guidelines of continental governance. The AU still intends to ‘[D]efend the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States’64and upholds the 
notion that all member states should be considered sovereign equals. 
Ringing the changes 
The principles of the AU also dictate that no state should interfere in the domestic affairs of 
another. However, the AU has diverted from the obstinate approach of ‘no interference’ by 
giving itself the authority to ‘intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the 
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity.’65 This has been welcomed as a significant step in the direction of cultivating 
genuine authority for the organisation. Another important principle that the organisation has 
introduced is the outright condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes in 
government.66 When one considers that one of the core objectives of the African Union has 
been to promote and respect democratic principles and institutions, good governance, and the 
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rule of law, it is only fitting then that the AU has made explicit reference of illegal transitions 
of governance in their Constitutive Act.   
However, the introduction of the AU Constitutive Act does not mark the first attempt at 
formally recognising and denouncing illegal political transitions in Africa. Despite its 
shortfalls, the OAU should be credited with identifying the debilitating effects that military 
coups and other forms of UCG have had on Africa’s democratic development. An OAU 
Heads of State and Government summit in Harare in 1997 saw the formal adoption of a 
common position on unconstitutional changes in government. Heads of State would elaborate 
on this position during an OAU Summit in Algiers in 1999, ushering in what was known as 
the ‘Algiers Decision on Unconstitutional Changes in Government.’67 One of the more 
concrete decisions to come out of the Algiers summit was the ‘banning from the OAU 
Summits of all governments that had taken power through a coup since the last summit.’68
These early endeavours to formally make mention of UCG by the OAU were, for the most 
part, superficial in nature. Whilst the OAU could no longer overlook illegal usurpations of 
power on the continent, the organisation’s traditional propensity for inaction and its limited
enforcement capacity meant that any formal agreements surrounding UCG lacked the 
required follow-up action.
In spite of this, a movement towards preventing and responding to illegitimate political 
takeovers maintains its roots in the initial attempts of the OAU to bring the issue to the 
discussion table. 
A declaration to progress    
The Lomé Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes 
of Government (commonly referred to as the Lomé Declaration) was adopted at the 36 
Ordinary Session of the Assembly Heads of State and Governments of the OAU in the 
Tongolese capital between 10-12 July 2000.69 Taking much from both the Harare and Algiers 
Summit of 1997 and 1999, the Lomé Declaration set out a definition of what constituted an 
unconstitutional change of government, highlighted a set of common values and principles 
for democratic governance on the continent, and put forward measures and actions that the 
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OAU would progressively take to respond to such changes in government.70 It is important to 
note that the policy framework established in Lomé (under the name of the Organisation of 
African Unity) has been assimilated into the African Union’s broader policy concerning UCG 
and its prescriptions are the guiding principles upon which the AU now approaches when 
dealing with such acts. The policy framework that was precipitated out of the Lomé Summit 
afforded the OAU/AU the ability to immediately and publically condemn any UCG and 
demand that constitutional order be restored within six months.71 Within this six month 
period, the state in which the unconstitutional takeover has occurred should be suspended 
from participating in any of the OAU/AU policy organs, stripping the state concerned of any 
bona fide membership capacity (yet this does not preclude the state from honouring its 
financial contributions to the OAU/AU budget).72
It should be made clear that despite the ambiguous wording within the declaration, the state 
itself is not precluded from entering into official AOU/AU affairs, but rather the offending 
government.73 The Secretary-General/Chairperson of the OAU/AU is assigned the task of 
making contact with the perpetrators of an unconstitutional takeover with the view of 
establishing their intentions to re-establish legitimate constitutionality within the state. This 
pressure by the organisation should be exerted in conjunction with the support of other 
member states in an effort to place as much moral pressure on the perpetrators as possible.74
The framework also explicitly outlines the fact that at the expiration of the six months 
suspension period, a number of limited and targeted sanctions can be levelled at an 
uncooperative regime, including visa denials for the perpetrators, restrictions concerning 
government-to-government contact, and various trade restrictions.75
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The notional tenets supporting the Lomé Declaration have not gone without their fair share of 
criticism. Of primary concern is the fact that the declaration leans almost exclusively on the 
procedural dimensions of legitimacy – establishing prescriptions concerning how power is 
acquired and not how it is exercised. The nature of the declaration fails to substantively 
address the often undemocratic practices of incumbent political regimes that, despite often 
being legitimately elected into office, subvert constitutional principles and hardly uphold 
democratic ideals. Further question have been raised over the process and outcomes of 
elections in Africa. Traditionally seen as a prerequisite for democratic transitions in 
government, incumbent governments have often allowed ‘free and fair’ elections to take 
place, only to discredit them by using state resources and varying means of duress to 
influence the outcome in their favour. One could fairly suggest that these underlying 
‘foundations’ of democracy are of more concern and should have the backing of a ‘Lomé -
style’ declaration that clearly sets out procedures and responses to deal with incumbent 
governments (whether democratically elected or not) that fail to live up to the prescribed AU 
principles concerning good governance and constitutionality. 
It has become increasingly evident that the AU must respond to both the acquisition and 
exercise of political power in Africa in order to comprehensively ‘weed-out’ any form of 
unconstitutionality or oppressive governance on the continent. 
This report recognises the importance of promptly and effectively addressing the 
transgressions of legitimately elected governments and (as addressed in chapter 1) history has 
shown that both democratically elected and military-ruled governments have failed to bring 
adequate stability and democratic permanence to the continent. In this regard, an organisation 
like the African Union should continue to endeavour in establishing and enforcing a more 
concrete policy framework in dealing with those African governments that, whilst legitimate 
in many respects, continue to tarnish Africa’s prospects of achieving comprehensive 
democracy and constitutionality. However, the illegal usurpation of elected governments will 
continue to undercut any progress that is made in the promotion of democratic ideals and 
poses a direct challenge to the construction of accepted political norms on the continent. As 
the Lomé Declaration suggests, Africa should view military coups ‘as an unacceptable and 
anachronistic act, which is in contradiction of our commitment to promote democratic 
principles and conditions.’76 The AU is in a position in which it is able to create and protect 
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such norms. The Lomé Declaration and the organisation’s Constitutive Act, even when taking 
into account the large schism between theory and practice, still serve to map out the 
normative prescriptions for constitutionality and respect for the rule of law. 
Securing a democratic future
Taking into account the Lomé Declaration and the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
(which effectively reaffirms and supports the policy framework established in Lomé), the 
third mechanism relating to UCG is the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance. This (not yet officially ratified) charter was adopted in Addis Ababa during 
the 8th Ordinary Summit of the African Union in January 2007 (often referred to as the 
Addis Charter). The Addis Charter can be seen as the end result of Africa’s initial post-
OAU democratisation process and has taken much from forgoing developments in 
formulating a compressive policy framework concerning good governance, 
constitutionality and democracy. Reaffirming many aspects of both the AU Constitutive 
Act as well as elements of the Lomé Declaration, some of the goals of the Addis Charter 
include: adherence by AU member states to principles of good governance, human rights, 
constitutional order, the rule of law, political transparency and accountability, and the 
promotion of democratic practice and culture.77 In setting out the principles by which the 
Charter will be enforced, the AU has once again reiterated the threat posed by UCG. By 
stating its support for the ‘condemnation and total rejection of unconstitutional changes of 
Government’78 and making explicit reference to the need for member states to ‘take all 
appropriate measures to ensure constitutional rule, particularly constitutional transfer of 
power’79, the Addis Charter is a vital policy tool in restating the normative prescriptions of 
constitutional rule in Africa. 
The Charter adopts a holistic approach to democracy, in that it covers a broad spectrum of 
issues pertaining to the maintenance and furthering of democratic ideals. Human rights, 
regional cooperation, economic development, free and fair elections, respecting defined 
terms of political office, support for civil society, and the separation of powers are some of 
the issues that the Charter addresses. All of these issues maintain a bearing on the ability 
for widespread democracy to take root in Africa. Not only does the Charter tackle head-on 
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the governance issues that have long plagued the continent, it also establishes democracy 
and popular participation as a fundamental human right.80
An entire chapter of the Addis Chapter has been set aside to map out the necessary courses 
of action to be taken in the event of an UCG. Whilst reaffirming the proposed punitive 
measures of the Constitutive Act (suspension from all AU activities, imposition of certain 
economic and travel sanctions etc.), the Addis Charter affords the AU the power to actively 
seek out, detain and prosecute perpetrators of an unconstitutional putsch before a 
competent AU court.81 Unconstitutional transfers of political power command a significant 
amount of focus within the Addis Charter and it is clear that the AU now perceives such 
transitions as one of the primary challenges to promoting democratic norms in Africa. The 
Preamble of the Addis Charter has gone as far as to state that African leaders are concerned 
‘about the unconstitutional changes of governments that are one of the essential causes of 
insecurity, instability and violent conflict in Africa.’82
Up to the task
After assuming the responsibility of continental governance, the African Union now stands in 
a unique position in which it is able promote a new set of political norms and values in 
Africa. The AU has already demonstrated that the principles of absolute sovereignty and non-
interference have no place in Africa’s future political development. This shifting conception 
of sovereignty and a greater willingness on the part of the AU to intervene in the domestic 
affairs of individual states has provided a platform upon which the organisation can more 
effectively deal with the pressing issue of unconstitutional changes of government. 
The AU Constitutive Act, the Lomé Declaration and the African Charter on Democracy, 
Elections and Governance have all expressed the need for the Union to intervene in instances 
where an unconstitutional political takeover has been staged, most notably via military 
coup.83 The AU has set itself a broad mandate that seeks to entrench a culture of democracy 
and constitutionality on the continent and to this end, effective preventative and responsive 
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policy mechanisms are required. By condemning the act of military coups and other UCG 
through binding accords, the AU will not only be able to stamp out a genuine threat to 
sustained democracy, it will also begin to effectively generate an accepted norm of political 
governance. Thus, the success of the aforementioned policy mechanisms in effectively 
thwarting future unconstitutional political takeovers has a considerable bearing on the ability 
of the African Union to achieve its broader goals for the continent. The reaction and 
repercussions flowing from the recent military coups in Mauritania and Guinea lend insight 
into how the African Union’s policies regarding UCG are being implemented. 
With the recent political upheavals in West Africa serving as a backdrop, the African Union’s 
current policy mechanisms must be critically assessed in order to establish whether or not 
they will prove to be successful and if not, what policy reformations should be taken on board 
by the AU to remedy the situation.
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Chapter 3
Response and Prevention
“If we do not maintain Justice, Justice will not maintain us.”84
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The African Union now places a considerable emphasis on the issue of unconstitutional 
changes of government (UCG) and recognises the importance of successfully dealing with 
this recurrent challenge to positive political growth. The ratification of the Lomé Declaration 
and the development of African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (yet to be 
ratified at the time of writing) points to the adoption of a more authoritative stance by the 
AU. The organisation’s Constitutive Act is further evidence of the African Union’s resolve to 
more effectively control not only how political power is exercised, but also how political 
power is attained. This robust stance on the imperative issues of constitutionality and good 
governance has done much to strengthen overall awareness regarding democracy and the rule 
of law. Importantly, the African Union maintains the ability to significantly inform 
contemporary norms concerning Africa’s political landscape. 
Whilst the Organisation of African Unity neglected to address issues of acceptable political 
transition and good governance, thereby failing to instil norms of accountability and political 
transparency, the AU can now influence Africa’s political trajectory by establishing 
responsible governance and constitutionality as immovable political norms. However, the 
creation of policy mechanisms needs to be supplemented by the effective implementation of 
the prescriptions and responses that these mechanisms espouse. In the interests of legitimacy, 
the African Union cannot be seen to be an organisation that only ‘barks’ and does not ‘bite’. 
It is imperative that the AU distinguishes itself from its decidedly ineffectual predecessor by 
following through with its commitment to promote a culture of democracy across the 
continent. 
Stamping out the incidence of unconstitutional political takeovers is now posited towards the 
centre of the African Union’s broader mandate. This mandate looks to create a political 
atmosphere in which the principles of constitutionality dictate the terms by which 
governments come into power, as well as the terms by which that power is exercised. It is 
with this in mind, that the recent political events in Mauritania and Guinea should be seen as 
an alarming diversion on Africa’s road to immutable constitutional rule and political 
legitimacy.85 Thus, if the current policy mechanisms aimed at preventing and responding to 
unconstitutional changes of government are deemed ineffectual, attempts by the AU to 
achieve its desired goals for the political development of the continent would be in jeopardy.
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The effectiveness of current policies are largely influenced by both a) their prescriptive 
content i.e. the nature of the policy itself and b) how these various polices are implemented 
by the AU. An analysis of the AU response to the military coups in Mauritania and Guinea 
lends insight as to how these two factors will largely determine whether the AU can 
successfully limit the frequency of unconstitutional political takeovers; and instil a 
corresponding acceptance of constitutionality and democratic rule as an ingrained norm.    
Standing its ground
The African Union wasted little time in publically condemning the political events that 
occurred in both Mauritania and Guinea in 2008. Following the August 6th coup in 
Mauritania, the AU made it clear that it would suspend Mauritania’s membership in the 
organisation until constitutional order had been restored. The organisation immediately called 
for the release of the country’s democratically elected leader, Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh 
Abdallahi. These demands were followed by a high level mission to Mauritania on December 
6th, in which AU representatives engaged with coup leader General Mohamed Ould Abdel 
Aziz and received a commitment from him to release President Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh 
Abdallahi without conditions by December 24th.86 This promise was indeed kept by 
Mauritania’s coup leader, yet this did by no means represent the return to constitutional order 
that the AU had demanded. 
In a number of Peace and Security Council (PSC) communiqués, the AU Constitutive Act, 
the Lomé Declaration, and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 
were all referenced in the African Union’s call to respect constitutionality. Specifically in line 
with the provisions of the Lomé Declaration, the AU urged the Chairperson of the AU 
Commission to continue to place pressure on Mauritania’s coup leaders and persist with 
demands for a return to constitutional order in the country. Moreover, the PSC declared that 
if constitutional order was not restored in Mauritania by February 5th 2009, the PSC ‘will 
impose measures, including targeted sanctions, in particular visa denials, travel restrictions 
and freezing of assets, to all individuals, both civilian and military, whose activities are 
designed to maintain the unconstitutional status quo in Mauritania.’87 Upon failing to meet 
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this requirement, the PSC followed through by imposing a travel ban on civilians and soldiers 
in the military government as well as a freezing off their assets. 
The AU continued to pursue a return to constitutional order in Mauritania with both the 
Chairperson of the Executive Council of the AU and the Commissioner for Peace and 
Security visiting the country and maintaining communication ties with the military 
government.88 This continual pressure led to the formation of a transitional government, 
divided between civilian politicians and soldiers that was established to take hold of 
government until elections could be held in July 2009. The AU reacted to the formation of an 
interim government by lifting the sanctions that were imposed in February and seemed 
pleased with the developments in Mauritania. Despite the fact that General Mohamed Ould 
Abdel Aziz put himself in the running for the presidential election, the AU welcomed the 
election and hoped that it would take place in the ‘required conditions of transparency, 
fairness, and freedom’.89 Amid extensive calls of electoral malpractice, the results of the July 
18th elections rendered General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz the elected President of 
Mauritania.90
A new generation of coup
The events in Mauritania have placed the AU in extraordinary position in which, although its 
calls for a return to constitutional order have technically been met, one cannot ignore the 
circumstances under which this ‘constitutional order’ has been brought about. Opposition 
parties were quick to point out that the military junta used its position of power to sway 
public opinion and instigated a number of irregularities in voting conditions in which the 
results were ‘prefabricated, meant to legitimise the coup that brought General Aziz to 
power.’91 Many observers have concluded that the events in Mauritania do not represent a 
bona fide return to constitutional order and that the increasing incidence of ‘creeping coups’ 
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or ‘coup conversion’92 must be immediately addressed. This phenomenon is characterised by 
a successful coup d’état that is followed by the staging of ‘free and fair’ elections. As one 
would expect, those that have already taken power maintain a considerable advantage over 
political opposition and are often quick to use state resources and man-power to manipulate 
election results in their favour. The resultant outcome of these types of elections often instate 
coup leaders into ‘official’ political office and distract regional and international observers 
from the initial coup and the bypassing of constitutional order.
The 2008 military coup in Guinea, lead by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, precipitated a 
similar response from the AU. The country was suspended for a period of six months from 
taking part in all AU activities until constitutional order had been reinstated. In its 
condemnation, a PSC statement dubbed the coup a ‘flagrant violation of the Constitution of 
Guinea and of the relevant AU instruments’93. The Chairman of the AU Commission 
immediately made contact with Guinea’s coup leader and communicated the fact that the AU 
would impose targeted sanctions on the military junta if free and fair elections were not held 
in due time. Again, the situation in Guinea represents a case of a ‘creeping coup’ in which the 
military junta made lofty promises regarding the formation of a caretaker government that 
would steer the country to credible elections within two years.94 In the midst of the AU 
calling for a legitimate return to constitutionality, the military regime set about appointing a 
civilian Prime Minister and forming a transitional government in January of 2009. Beyond 
this, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara himself stated that neither he nor the newly elected 
Prime Minister would stand in the planned presidential elections. 
These pronouncements seemingly suggested a genuine commitment to constitutionality and 
an indication that persistent AU pressure is able to alter the trajectory of what traditionally 
may have simply been a political power-grab without any subsequent ‘democratic 
considerations’. However, as events in Guinea have played out, it is clear that the military 
junta under Captain Camara is more concerned with holding onto its position of power than 
                                                          
92 The terms ‘creeping coup’ and ‘coup conversion’ have been lent from a statement by the Board of the Mo 
Ibrahim Foundation (October 6 2009). The Foundation was established by Sudanese billionaire Mo Ibrahim and 
provides monetary rewards fro those African leaders who uphold responsible methods of governance. 
93 ‘Guinea: African Union Suspends Country over Coup’ (author unknown) at www.allafrica.com, 26 December 
2008 (accessed 27 July 2009)
94 Souare, I ‘Explaining the December 2008 Military Coup D’état in Guinea’ at 
kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/101182/.../Chapter+4.pdf (accessed 27 July 2009)
42
leading the country down the path of democracy. The killing of over 150 civilians by the 
Guinean military on 28th September 2009 exposed the true brutality of the Camara regime 
and lead to the imposition of targeted sanctions by the AU.95 The killings occurred during a 
protest against the prospect of Camara running in the scheduled January 2010 elections.
Halting the creep 
The unconstitutional usurpation of power, even when followed by subsequent elections, 
should still be viewed as an undercutting of democratic principles and constitutionality 
(regardless of the attempts by the illegal government to legitimise themselves via the staging 
of elections). In the case of Mauritania however, the AU electoral observer mission declared 
the elections ‘free, transparent, credible and democratic’96, effectively recognising General 
Aziz’s right to the presidency. This came after the AU had insisted that no member of the 
military junta should be allowed to stand in future presidential elections. Although this type 
of recognition would seem to contradict the African Union’s broader ideals of genuine 
democracy and constitutionality, an analysis of its current policy mechanisms reveals that as 
it stands, the AU does not possess the legal capacity to adequately address the issue of post-
coup self-legitimisation. 
Considering that neither the Lomé Declaration nor the AU Constitutive Act speak directly to 
the issue of ‘creeping coups’, the initial insistence that no member of the military junta stand 
in the elections could not be backed up by any existing AU policies.97 Only the African
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance deals explicitly with this issue by stating 
that the ‘perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government shall not be allowed to 
participate in elections held to restore the democratic order or to hold any position of 
responsibility in political institutions of their State’.98 However, it must be noted that the 
Addis Charter has not yet entered into force and thus far, only Mauritania (ironically) and 
Ethiopia have ratified the charter.99 ‘Creeping coups’ pose a complex challenge to the AU 
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and as part of their response to UCG, should look to take a firm stance in instances where 
genuine constitutionality is being subverted. A degree of overlap is apparent in the case of 
‘creeping coups’ as this type of political event raises questions regarding both the African 
Union response to coup d’états as well as the organisation’s monitoring of elections and its 
power to declare certain elections  undemocratic. One could fairly suggest then that the AU 
was legally powerless to adequately address the post-coup situation in Mauritania and unable 
to affect any reform in Guinea, yet made use of its current (and ratified) policy mechanisms 
to their full extent. In this respect, the AU should be credited with referencing its available 
policy options and putting them into effect.
The follow-up
The AU has adopted a firm stance in dealing with the military coup d’états in both Mauritania 
and Guinea. The organisation has not wasted any time in making use of its various UCG-
orientated policy instruments, be it the suspension of Mauritania and Guinea from all AU 
activities or the imposition of targeted sanctions. From this perspective, the AU cannot be 
faulted in terms of how it has applied its prescribed policies. Strictly speaking however, this 
systematic application has not precipitated the desired outcome in either Mauritania or 
Guinea. Mauritania’s coup leader now maintains a ‘legitimate’ claim to the presidency thanks 
to highly tainted presidential elections, whilst the leader of Guinea’s military coup is 
stubbornly avoiding any genuine commitment to constitutionality. Along with the query 
regarding how the AU applies its UCG policies, a discussion on the follow-up capabilities of 
the AU falls into the broader question of how the AU responds to UCG.
It has already been established that the AU should be credited for the way it has dealt with 
both military coups; actively applying the policies instruments it has established for dealing 
with UCG. However, the application of these policy instruments clearly does not 
automatically suggest that coup perpetrators will fall into line, be it via legitimate elections or 
the handing back of power to the pre-coup government. Some observers have criticised the 
substantive content of the various UCG policy instruments as being too vague or limited in 
scope. The imposition of sanctions and the barring of coup-induced governments from taking 
part in AU activities is often seen as an inadequate response, even when these policies are 
accurately applied. The barring of coup perpetrators from taking part in AU activities can 
only realistically limit the overall credibility of the new regime and perhaps the potential for 
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establishing political ties with other member states. Yet for those coup perpetrators looking to 
take hold of power and enjoy the benefits of controlling state resources, this exclusion is a 
small price to pay. Applying targeted sanctions against coup perpetrators is limited by 
systemic faults, with Issaka Souare of the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria suggesting 
that the African Union ‘does not have an effective power of stick and carrot, so the sanctions 
are very symbolic’.100 In calling for a more substantive response, certain analysts have called 
for the AU to take note of the military approach adopted by the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) in safeguarding civilian governments within its member 
states.101 Many hold the view that the implementation of ‘soft measures’ cannot realistically 
hope to provide the kind of deterrent required to make coup-plotting a truly costly exercise 
for potential coup instigators.102   
Beyond the fact that the African Union’s follow-up capabilities are limited, the issue of 
‘creeping coups’ clearly represents a procedural predicament for the AU as it allows coup 
perpetrators to technically satisfy the demands of the AU whilst actively pursuing a self-
legitimisation process. The cases of Mauritania and Guinea illustrate the fact that the current 
AU policy instruments surrounding UCG (despite good premises and credible application) 
still lack the necessary content to comprehensively respond to military coups, particularly in 
instances where attempts are made at auto-legitimisation. The aforementioned limits on the 
legal capability of the AU in addressing ‘creeping coups’; suggests that the ratification of the 
Addis Charter is a much needed step in the process of effectively responding to auto-
legitimisation. However, whilst the ratification of the Addis Charter may bolster the African 
Union’s existing rights of recourse in dealing with UCG, it is likely that the insufficient 
follow-up capabilities and lack of ‘real’ power on the part of the AU will continue to limit the 
ability of the organisation to respond in such a way that the principles of constitutionality are 
effectively protected. 
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The power of prevention
Does this render the AU an ineffectual organisation in the context of Africa’s positive 
political development? Does the fact that its response mechanism lacks the impetus of ‘real’ 
power suggest that it has no hope of effecting any change in the incidence of UCG? This 
report suggests not. An analysis of the AU response to UCG has illustrated how the AU has 
successfully responded to illegal transfers of power in the sense that it has used its various 
policy mechanisms to their full extent and applied them in a timely fashion. The organisation 
has been unsuccessful, however, in precipitating outcomes that are consistent with the end 
goal of these policy instruments. This paper will now look to illustrate how, the limitations of 
the current AU response mechanisms can be remedied by addressing the prevention aspect of 
UCG. 
The African Union’s policy mechanisms related to UCG focus on ‘post-the-fact-reactions’103
and only offer a policy framework based on reaction. By establishing a system of prevention, 
the AU should effectively be able to bypass the challenges posed by post-coup situations and 
the intricacies of restabilising constitutionality once it has been spoiled. In the case of UCG, 
however, prevention cannot simply be based on the establishment of a credible trigger 
mechanism that could be used to signal potentially volatile domestic situations and induce a 
pre-emptive response. The clandestine nature of military coups allow for illegal political 
takeovers to come about with little forewarning and take the ruling government by surprise. 
A preventative policy, in the true sense of the term would demand the AU directly reach out 
to those potential coup perpetrators and dissuade them from pursuing their unconstitutional 
political takeover- an impossible task for obvious reasons. Thus, in the pursuit of a viable 
prevention mechanism, this paper suggests that the AU be tasked with creating and protecting 
a new set of steadfast political norms that bind member states to a broad collection of 
democratic and constitutional ideals. If these ideals can become entrenched within the 
domestic political landscape of individual member states, then it is feasible that the African 
Union would no longer have to intervene in instances of constitutional and democratic 
malpractice. Contemporary norm creation thus stands a feasible means of the AU achieving 
its goal of eliminating UCG from the continent as well as achieving its long-term mandate.   
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Setting the standard
Preventing future illegal transfers of power from taking place is largely concurrent with the 
development of strong normative ideals that render UCG an unacceptable mode of power 
transition. Much as the international political arena has experienced a wide-spread wave of 
democratisation since the end of the Cold War and Africa has certainly made positive strides 
towards a greater acceptance and adherence to democracy and good governance.104 An 
analysis of UCG trends throughout Africa’s history shows that, since the inception of the 
Lomé Declaration, there has been a marked decrease in the continental per decade rate of 
UCG (9/decade). This continental-wide decrease in best put in perspective when one 
considers that West Africa alone experienced 13 unconstitutional changes of government 
between 1963-70, 11 between 1971-80, and 7 between 1981-90.105 Whilst global trends of 
democratisation have certainly played their part in reducing the incidence of military coups 
and other UCG, the African Union should be applauded for its determined pursuit of 
widespread constitutionality and Africa’s political betterment. By engaging with leaders from 
across the continent and persistently making reference to the importance of democracy within 
the context of Africa’s future development, the AU has served to cultivate a political 
landscape in which deviations from constitutionality are met with an immediate response. 
The issue of unconstitutional changes of government illustrates how, through the adoption of 
various policy instruments and official legislation, the AU has created a ‘web’ of normative 
ideals that has permeated throughout Africa’s political atmosphere. The ability of the AU to 
preside over Africa’s political progress places the organisation in a position in which it is able 
to shrewdly lead its member states down the path toward greater democracy. The theory of 
political constructivism maintains that ideas, norms, and principles can be fashioned by 
discourse, communication, and socialisation amongst individual actors.106 As opposed to the 
theoretical tenants of realism, which presupposes that the interests of individual actors should 
be taken as given, constructivism suggests that actors respond to external changes in what is 
considered the norm. This response leads to an internalisation of generally accepted norms 
and practices, thus effectively influencing the actions and political nature of individual actors. 
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From a political perspective, the theory of constructivism holds that the coming together of 
states within a defined structure allows for a conglomeration of ideas to merge into defined 
normative parameters. 
The AU serves as a political entity which can facilitate this coming together of individual 
actors and allow for normative and ideational tenets to be developed. As has been illustrated, 
the African Union’s lack of ‘stick and carrot’ limits its ability to forcefully impose its 
determined parameters of good political practice, yet this does not mean that the organisation 
does not wield another form of power. This power is derived from the legitimacy of the 
rational-legal authority they embody and the control over information and resources.107 As 
has been observed within other international organisations, the ‘machinery’ of an 
organisation maintains a degree of power as often ‘the machinery’s norms and rules constrain 
what states do, but the machinery itself is passive’.108 The power of the AU to generate norms 
provides the organisation with an influential tool with which to implement its continental 
‘game plan’.   
However, it is evident that these AU commitments to greater constitutionality and democracy 
have not translated into an immutable adherence on the part of all AU members. Observers 
are quick to point out that, despite the development of groundbreaking policy instruments 
aimed at addressing UCG and promoting the notion of continental-wide adherence to 
constitutionality, Africa has witnessed a number of military coups or other illegal transitions 
of power since the Lomé Declaration was adopted in July of 2000.109
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Table 3.1
Cases of Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa since 2000110
Country Date
Mauritius January 2002
Central African Republic 15 March 2003
Sao Tome and Principe 17 July 2003
Guinea-Bissau 14 September 2003
Togo 5 February 2005
Mauritania 3 August 2005
Mauritania 6 August 2008
Guinea 23 December 2008
Mauritius 17 March 2009
This figure is heavily influenced by the fact that, whilst Africa has witnessed an overall 
development in the levels of democracy and rule of law within individual states, illegal 
usurpations of power (the most common being military coup d’états, as commented on in 
chapter 1) are orchestrated by a handful of individuals acting in their own personal capacity. 
Mauritania, for example, was beginning to show signs that a healthy democracy was 
beginning to take root before General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz initiated his own illegal 
political takeover. How then should the AU hope to shape Africa’s political future through 
the development of positive normative ideals when groups of disgruntled individuals 
maintain the ability to override democracy? The answer to this question lies in the ability of 
the AU to more compressively address the governance practices of incumbent regimes.  
Legitimacy vs. Legality 
Protecting the ideal of constitutional political takeover will require the AU to continue with 
its outright condemnation of UCG and the continual development of progressive policy 
mechanisms (despite the sighted shortfalls in follow-up capacity). This can only help to 
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entrench the notion that legitimate and constitutional political transitions are the only 
acceptable means through which a government should come to power – thus diffusing this 
normative and ideational doctrine throughout Africa’s political and social landscape. 
However, there is more to the African Union’s task than continually speaking to the issue of 
UCG. The AU must endeavour to more adequately address the pressing issue of 
constitutional ‘tinkering’ on the part of incumbent governments, many of whom were elected 
via constitutional processes. African political development has suffered due to the inadequacy 
and ineffectiveness of its governance institutions, as well as the lack of respect for these 
institutions by both the governors and the governed on the continent.111 Whilst the AU should 
be credited for playing a prominent role in the recent progression of democratisation on the 
continent, it is clear that in order to effectively establish a culture of constitutional 
sanctification in Africa, the organisation will have to tackle the principle sources of political 
instability that lend to the incidence of UCG.
Critics have been more than happy to point out how the AU is willing to condemn 
unconstitutional political takeovers and brand coup perpetrators as enemies of democracy, 
when a perturbing number of AU member states are lead by governments and heads of state 
that hardly uphold the ideals of democracy themselves. Thus, the issue of UCG should be 
approached from two sides: one being the conduct of the incumbent government and its 
respect for democracy and constitutionality and the other being the position of those wanting 
to oust the government and come into power. It has been argued that a policy mechanism 
such as the Lomé Declaration overemphasises the notion of ‘legality’ over the more essential 
ideal of ‘legitimacy’.112 ‘Most of the heads of state have been in power for 20 to 30 years.
And so when they go for AU heads of states meetings it is really difficult for them to 
condemn say [Robert] Mugabe or Gadhafi or [the late Lansana] Conte at the time when he 
was still alive, because they are very senior citizens who are supposed to be wise.’113
The issue of presidential term-limits should be highlighted as one of the primary areas of 
focus within a compressive AU preventative policy aimed at reducing the possibility of coup 
                                                          
111 Ikome, F.N op cit pg 34
112 ‘The Challenges of Unlawful Changes of Regime’ (author unknown)
at://www.pambazuka.org/aumonitor/comments/2295/ (accessed 22 November 2009)
113 ‘Unconstitutional Power Grabs Threaten African Democracy’ (author unknown) at 
http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-09-14-voa58-68709027.html (accessed 23 November 
2009)
50
d’états taking place. The Addis Charter makes the first concrete mention of instituting an 
agreed upon framework concerning presidential term-limits and any attempt at altering 
constitutional parameters in favour of the incumbent regime, ‘[t]he ultimate aim would be to 
adopt a binding continent-wide policy on two-term limits of a maximum of seven years for 
presidential mandates for a minimum period of three decades or thereabout and to 
categorically refuse any change to this policy.’114 Evidence suggests that the overstay of long-
standing African leaders is often accompanied by incompetent governance which a) fuels 
political instability in that country b) serves as a constant pretext or justification for military 
coups and c) stands in the way of establishing a culture of smooth and regular changes of 
government in Africa.115
The Addis Charter may canvass a broad spectrum of issues concerning democracy and 
constitutionality (with a particular focus on UCG) yet, once again, much of its prescriptive 
content is deemed practically unviable. ‘[T]he Charter fails to devote more than a passing 
reference to the undemocratic constitutions that provide the legal basis of many illegitimate 
regimes in Africa. Because of this, the Charter effectively evades the issue in that it attempts 
to prevent unconstitutional changes of government without addressing the fundamental 
problem, since many unconstitutional regime changes (coups) in Africa have clearly stemmed 
from political stalemates that in turn often stem from the lack of alternation between political 
parties, which itself is caused by constitutions that, in these situations, are tailor-made to 
perpetuate the regimes in power.’116
Undemocratic rule further impedes legitimate political transition in instances where 
incumbents amend existing constitutional provisions, alter party procedures and rules and 
engage in blatant gerrymandering in order to extend their own terms in power or anoint a 
successor of their own choosing – all of which exclude the wider citizenry from legitimately 
participating in the succession process.117
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Table 3.2 
African Heads of State that have left power ‘after losing elections’ since independence.118
No. Leader Country Came to power Departed
1 Aristide Pereira Cape Verde July 1975 Feb. 1991
2 Mathieu Kérékou Benin Oct. 1972 March 1991
3 Kenneth Kaunda Zambia Oct. 1964 Nov. 1991
4 Denis Sassou N’Gueso Rep. of Congo Feb. 1979 Aug. 1992
5 Didier Ratsiraka Madagascar June 1975 March 1993
6 Hastings Banda Malawi July 1964 March 1994
7 Nicéphore Soglo Benin March 1991 March 1996
8 Abdou Diouf Senegal Jan. 1981 March 2000
Removing motivation
The AU cannot hope to effectively address the issue of UCG if it is not willing to condemn 
the equally unconstitutional actions of incumbent African governments and begin to remove 
any possible means of justification from potential coup-plotters. Indeed, one of the more 
common justifications used by successful coup instigators is the fact that the previous regime 
did either not allow for any democratic avenues through which constitutional transition could 
take place or so blatantly abused its power in office that institutions such as the military could 
snatch power without any outright civilian opposition. Delphine Lecoutre of the Institute of 
Peace and Security Studies at Addis Ababa University illustrates the correlation between bad 
governance on the part of an incumbent regime and the reaction by those being governed in 
an atmosphere of democratic suppression, in stating that ‘if they cannot be a political 
opposition party or have access to elections by themselves, they will access it by military 
means.’119
Thus, the AU retains the ability of ‘normative influence’ and should look to build on its 
earlier endeavours to promote greater levels of democracy and constitutionality across the 
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continent. In doing so, the act of UCG could quite possibly become unthinkable in a political 
atmosphere in which only legal transitions of power are deemed acceptable. However, in 
order for this norm creation to have any meaningful effect, the organisation must look to 
address the inadequacies its condemnation of illegal usurpations of power when compared 
with its acceptance of bad governance on the part of incumbent regimes. In making explicit 
reference of this, the AU can hope to create an equally strong normative framework that does 
not permit unconstitutional and unacceptably prolonged periods of governance. This would 
serve to not only inadvertently reach out to those potential coup-plotters by removing one of 
the primary justifications for executing a military coup d’état but also strengthen the 
normative and ideational concerns for smooth and frequent transitions of political power in 
Africa.          
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Chapter 4
A New Beginning
“A leader is someone who steps back from the entire system and tries to build a more 
collaborative, more innovative system that will work over the long term.”120
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An analysis of the African Union response to the recent military coups within West Africa 
reveals how the organisation intends to deal with such deliberate unconstitutional changes of 
political power on the continent. Moreover, it illustrates how extensive the broader challenges 
of sustainable democracy and constitutionality are within the continent of Africa. It would be 
both premature and short-sighted to conclude (in light of the fact that unconstitutional 
political takeovers have continued to occur during the short time that the AU has been in 
existence) that the AU has failed in its attempt to curb the incidence of UCG on the continent 
or that its hopes of creating a culture of democracy and good governance are wishful at best 
and unattainable at worst. 
When reflecting on the African Union’s first decade of existence, the organisation should be 
credited with creating an extensive policy framework with which to address the ongoing 
political scourge that is UCG. Perhaps more importantly, the AU has made use of this policy 
framework in the face of recent military coups and has by no means taken these constitutional 
transgressions lightly. However, in the cases of Mauritania and Guinea, the thorough 
application of UCG-related policies has not rendered the desired outcome – a return to 
legitimate constitutional order. Thus, whilst the per decade rate of unconstitutional changes of 
power has dropped substantially under the tenure of the AU, the ability of the organisation to 
consistently precipitate its desired outcome still hinges in many ways on the ‘real’ power that 
it commands as a continental organisation. What changes then need to be implemented in 
order for the AU to become more effective in limiting both the occurrence of UCG and 
instances of illegal constitutional amendments on the part of incumbent governments? 
This report, in its conclusion, will illustrate that the reforming or complete overhaul of 
current policies relating to UCG and undemocratic practices is a short-term strategy that 
satisfies misguided demands for instant and comprehensive outcomes in instances of illegal 
political practice. Rather, an appreciation of the long-term benefits of positive norm creation 
and constructivist-style institutionalisation illustrates how vitally important it is for the AU to 
persistently draw attention to illegal political acts on the continent; implement the relevant 
policy mechanism, and emphasise then reemphasise the relevance and importance of the 
political ambitions the continent has set for itself. Without suggesting that the current AU 
policy instruments remain stagnant and cease to seek improvement, this report looks to 
emphasise the fact that unrealistic expectations levelled at the AU place the organisation in a 
negative light as an ineffective political entity that does not maintain the capacity to enforce 
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‘genuine’ change. It is only once we appreciate the subtle power the AU maintains in 
bringing about sustainable changes to the continent in the long run, that we can appreciate the 
importance of the organisation (along with its ‘flimsy’ policy framework) in bringing about 
an improved future for African politics. 
Africa’s post-colonial ‘teething’ period painted a bleak picture of a continent that was 
plagued by a repetitive tide of civil strife, economic collapse, authoritarian rule and illegal 
power grabs. In the midst of this developmental downturn, the respect and advancement of 
constitutionality and democracy was stifled as African political structures became 
increasingly unstable. Neither military nor civilian governments could seem to initiate a 
tangible turnaround in Africa’s political trajectory and in many cases; these governments 
simply compounded already existing political frailties. Both types of government proved to 
be equally capable of suppressing domestic democratic freedoms and overlooking any facets 
of constitutionality that may challenge their stranglehold over power, creating a dangerous 
culture of oppressive political rule that undercut the potential for contemporary statehood to 
become entrenched. From the time of Africa’s political independence until today, military 
coups have stood out as particularly damaging political acts that are most often perpetrated by 
a small group of military personal and characterised by a complete dismissal of democratic 
processes. 
Not only do military coups continue to upset the practice of political succession on the 
continent, they precede the coming into power of military governments that, despite often 
presenting themselves as a disciplined and capable entity, have little or no experience in 
matters of state governance. The ability of military coups to so swiftly and unexpectedly 
overrule an existing government makes them particularly threatening to any ambitions of 
creating a culture of consistent and fluid transitions from one democratically elected 
government to the next. Indeed, both incumbent governments and ambitious coup 
perpetrators have shown contempt for the core principles of constitutionality, whether this 
has been in the form of overriding or completing ignoring constitutional law whilst in power 
or bypassing the constitutionally defined avenues of gaining political power. This does not 
make for a fertile environment in which constitutionality and political legitimacy can be 
nurtured and has been a root cause of why Africa’s political history has been tainted. 
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The plight of West Africa has been emphasised due to its reputation as a traditional hotbed 
for UCG and totalitarian political rule, standing out as a sub-region that only comprises one 
third of the continent’s states, yet has accounted for more than half of all illegal political 
takeovers since African independence. Yet, West African has in recent years begun to show 
signs of positive political institutionalisation and has seemingly begun to turn its back on 
authoritarian regimes and demand a greater degree of democratic governance throughout the 
region. The transformation that occurred on the West African topography from the early 
1990’s was broadly accepted as a symbol of a new era of political development in the sub-
region.121 Unfortunately, military coups are exactly the kind of political act that is able to so 
swiftly reconfigure the political dynamics of not only an individual state, but an entire sub-
region. The long and arduous process of democratic consolidation and constitutional 
resoluteness can so easily be stalled (and often reversed) by the illegal actions of a few. The 
successive military coups in Mauritania and Guinea have one again placed West Africa at the 
centre of contemporary discourse surrounding UCG and have given credence to the notion 
that African will perhaps never comprehensively rid itself of unconstitutional changes of 
government. 
The history of military coups on the continent highlights how detrimental this form of 
unconstitutional change of government has been in relation to the fostering of 
constitutionality as an immovable political ideal that should be the preeminent principle by 
which African governance and political transitions are guided by. This cannot be achieved in 
the midst of continual political usurpations and illegitimate governance, nor can it be 
achieved without the presence and influence of a proficient continental body that is able to 
guide individual members towards a collective goal. The Organisation of African Unity failed 
to fulfil this role. A manifestation of Pan-African ideals, the OAU prove to be an impotent 
organisation that did not maintain the capacity to assert itself upon its member states. 
Moreover, the organisation was unable to establish a concrete policy framework with which 
to systematically deal with issues of UCG and undemocratic governance. Hence, the OAU 
was to preside over a period of African political history that, due to the plethora of illegal 
putsches and almost nonexistence of political accountability, has contemporary 
reverberations for current day continental governance. Many of the OAU’s failures can be 
attributed to the international political climate in which it was immersed for the majority of 
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its existence. Sovereignty enjoyed a privileged position within international perceptions of 
jurisprudence, remaining the centrepiece of Western constitutional theory.122 Absolute 
sovereignty and broad policies of non-intervention governed international, continental and 
regional interactions, placing considerable emphasis on the individual rights of the state and 
its ability to conduct its own affairs free from intercession. Without the guidance and 
intervention of a capable continental organisation, the dire domestic political affairs of many 
African states were left to fester. 
The African Union was to be born out of the need for a new and revitalised continental 
organisation that would be both willing and able to tackle Africa’s political transition and 
governance challenges. The AU was to immediately build upon many of the policy outlines 
that the OAU had begun to establish towards the end of its tenure, ensuring that the 
organisation’s Constitutive Act laid a strong foundation upon which effective continental 
governance could be build. The AU immediately hinted at fundamental policy reformations, 
most importantly departing from the long-standing tradition of non-intervention and the 
observance of absolute sovereignty. The Lomé Declaration tackled UCG head-on, 
establishing a standard 6 month post-coup period in which constitutional order would have to 
be restored. After the expiry of this period, the Declaration stipulates that targeted sanctions 
and imposed trade restrictions will be imposed on the illegitimate government as well as 
excluding the offending government from all AU activities. 
By placing considerable emphasis on the return to constitutional order and constitutionality, 
the Lomé Declaration lends insight into the African Union’s overall goals for the continent. It 
also serves to emphasis the importance the AU has placed on the acquisition of political 
power, recognising UCG as a fundamental challenge within the organisation’s wider goals 
for democracy and good governance. The (yet to be ratified) African Charter on Democracy, 
Elections and Governance (Addis Charter) stands as the most definitive policy document 
concerning UCG and extends aspects of both the AU Constitutive Act and the Lomé 
Declaration. It too categorically denounces any form of unconstitutional takeover, citing 
UCG as a primary source of instability and insecurity on the continent. 
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This report has assessed the role of the AU vis-à-vis the military coups in Mauritania and 
Guinea upon the basis of both the organisation’s application of current policy mechanisms, as 
well as the follow-up measures adopted post-application. These enquiries fall into a broader 
investigation regarding how the AU responds to UCG. 
The AU has not faltered with regards to actively applying the relevant  policy tools it has at 
its disposal; and in the face of recent illegal political takeovers in West Africa, the 
organisation wasted little time in publically condemning the actions of both General 
Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz and Captain Moussa Dadis Camara. Importantly, the AU 
followed predetermined policy procedures in immediately calling for returns to constitutional 
order in both states, abetted by open communication between the offending governments and 
AU officials. Furthermore, the AU has indeed imposed sanctions on both Mauritania and 
Guinea at various times since the coups were staged in August and December 2008 
respectively. These sanctions have been imposed in varying degrees in response to the non-
compliance of both illegitimate governments, representing a tangible departure from the 
OAU-inspired approach of non-interference. This should be welcomed as an indubitable 
commitment to actively applying policy rather than simply condemning such acts on paper 
and within public forum. 
However, as has been illustrated, the comprehensive application of predefined policy tools is 
only one aspect of the response query. Neither Mauritanian nor Guinea can be seen as 
examples of a successful AU response because the policy instruments used in condemning 
the political acts in those countries come with defined outcomes that the policies are intended 
to precipitate. Neither Mauritania nor Guinea have welcomed a bona fide return to 
constitutional order. The dissimilarity between enthusiastic application on one hand and 
inducing the desired effect on the other is a chief reason why the AU has attracted criticism 
relating to its effectiveness as a legitimate continental organisation. 
The issue of ‘creeping coups’ has also been presented as a further challenge to the AU and its 
efforts to enforce prescribed political conditions in post-coup environments. Whilst the return 
to constitutional order should remain the organisation’s fundamental goal in dealing with 
coup-induced governments, the pursuit of auto-legitimisation on the part of illegal 
governments presents the AU with a predicament that at present, cannot be remedied with 
any concrete (or ratified) policy framework. Calls by the AU to reinstitute constitutionality 
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can be essentially sidestepped by illegitimate governments through a process of converting an 
illegal coup into a quasi-constitutional state of affairs in which the coup perpetrators ascend 
to a position of ‘lawful’ political power. If the AU demands a return to constitutional order 
and the perpetrators of the coup are able to steer the country towards eventual presidential 
elections, one could suggest that the organisation’s requirements been met. However, it has 
been made clear that the AU cannot afford to accept these attempts at self-legitimisation as a 
result of the circumstances under which they occur. An election intended to restore 
constitutionality cannot be deemed acceptable when the political climate in which the 
elections are held cannot itself be deemed constitutional. The outcome of the presidential 
elections in Mauritania, whilst being extensively challenged on the grounds of legitimacy and 
fairness, have rendered Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz the president of the country, whilst 
Captain Moussa Dadis Camara and his military junta continue to evade a commitment to 
staging elections in that country. 
Whilst the Addis Charter sets out procedural directives and specific polices designed to tackle 
this new generation of coup, the fact that the Charter has yet to be ratified limits the African 
Union’s avenues of recourse and has left the organisation without an official position upon 
which to reference. Deficits in the depth of African Union policy relating to ‘creeping coups’ 
and ‘coup conversion’ compounds what some observers have deemed an overall incapacity 
on the part of the organisation to effectively respond to UCG. The AU cannot hope to address 
UCG without concurrently attending to the political actions of incumbent governments –
many of whom have been legitimately elected into power- that divert from democratic 
practice and subvert constitutional law. 
There are two obvious reasons for this. Firstly, the edicts of an organisation attempting to 
promote democracy and good governance will always lack credibility when active members 
of the organisation fail to uphold these ideals in their own capacity. The fact that certain 
African Heads of State are welcomed (and in some instances celebrated) into the AU without 
question, despite presiding over blatant undemocratic governments, weakens the 
organisation’s legitimacy. 123 Secondly, the oppressive rule of incumbent governments has 
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been sighted as one of the key stimulus behind military coups in Africa and is often used as 
motivation by coup perpetrators as to why their political usurpation should be welcomed as a 
necessary act in the face of inept political rule. Ardently addressing the issue of how 
governments come into power without simultaneously addressing the issue of how that power 
is exercised once in office is akin to painting the outside of a house whilst the interior 
remains a shambles.  
This report has sough to demonstrate that the respect for constitutionality remains a pivotal 
aspect of African political advancement, the achievement of which is impossible without first 
addressing one of constitutionality’s greatest repressors – unconstitutional changes of 
government. Questions have been raised as to whether or not the AU maintains the capacity 
to instil a continent-wide adherence to democracy and constitutionality on the part of 
governments in office, and more specifically, an engrained respect for the legal transition of 
political power. The question of ‘real’ power is often sighted as a reason for the AU 
ultimately being unable to achieve its defined goals with relation to UCG and undemocratic 
governance. Realists would be quick to point out that the ability of an organisation to enforce 
any type of reform is largely dependent on the actions, interests and desires of the individual 
units that make up the organisation.124 At present, the AU does not possess the capacity to 
strongly deter either incumbent governments from wondering outside the bounds of 
constitutional rule or potential coup perpetrators from bypassing the legal processes of 
political transitions – the consequences for these actions are simply not robust enough. This 
realist logic leaves one enquiring as to whether or not it is viable for an organisation such as 
the AU to pursue it’s predefined mandate for the continent without possessing the necessary 
‘stick’ with which to steer its individual members. Instead, this report has outlined the 
potential for the AU to potentially circumvent this ‘real’ power quandary by making use of its 
norm-creating power as a rational-legal authority.  
This report has made reference to the norm-creating abilities of the AU and seeks to show in 
conclusion that the abandoning or continual reformation of policy instruments – in light of 
the fact that these instruments have not completely eradicated the aforementioned challenges 
to democracy and constitutionality – is a counterproductive means of addressing a long-term 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
despite the fact that his second spell as president, commencing in 1997 (the first being from 1979 to 1992) 
came on the back of a political putsch. Further see www.african-union.org
124 Blanke, H. ‘Theories of International Organizations: The Realist, Instituionalist and Idealist School’ 
International Organizations, Working Paper 2, Winter 2008/09 pg 3
61
issue of political institutionalisation and normative political practice. A historical 
comparative assessment between the modern European state and its average African
counterpart reveals that the former has been able to develop over a significantly longer period 
of time, whilst the latter has been expected to assimilate contemporary elements of Western-
centric statehood in the past few decades. Liberal democracy has been part of the evolution of 
the European state and such things as the separation of powers, the rule of law, representative 
government, accepted principles of political succession and accountable bureaucracy have 
developed over time and not simply been instituted at will.125 A retrospective view reveals 
that Africa is now better placed at the outset of its political development than Europe was 
decades ago, the AU being able to comparatively ‘fast track’ and oversee the continent’s 
progress towards fully developed statehood, a luxury that Europe lacked for the majority of 
its early development. Political evolution is inevitable; it is the nature of the evolution which 
should be of most concern. 
In conclusion, the AU must persist with its current policy mechanisms with the understanding 
that the extent of the African Union’s ‘real’ power effectively limits the ability of the 
organisation to fully enforce its will in instances of UCG and undemocratic rule. This means 
that the continual application of current constitutionality-related polices may not produce the 
immediate and explicit results that they intend to precipitate. Yet this should not deter the AU 
from persisting with (and continually advancing) their attempts to control the pervasiveness 
of undemocratic rule and unconstitutional changes of governments on the continent, with 
particular focus on the military coup d’état, which remains the most prolific and damaging 
form of UCG. The immediacy of the results, or lack thereof, should not deter the AU from 
realising its potential as an avenue for creating new ideas, rules and norms for the continent 
in the future. The Lomé Declaration and the Addis Charter need to be continually referenced 
in order to repeatedly emphasise the goals that the continent has set for itself and to illustrate 
that Africa is making a tangible departure from its bleak political past. The importance of the 
AU in terms of the Africa’s long-term political trajectory cannot be understated. By reflecting 
the values and norms on which it was founded and influencing the values and norms of 
participating actors126, the AU can seek to passively ‘shepherd’ the continent of Africa 
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toward an era in which the still fragile democratic and constitutional values of today become 
the accepted norms of tomorrow. 
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